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Abstract: A basic income might be able to correct for the income related losses of 
unemployment, but what about the meaning/purpose related losses? For better or worse, 
many people derive meaning and fulfillment from the jobs they do; if their jobs are taken 
away, they lose this source of meaning. If we are about the enter an era of rampant job 
loss as a result of advances in technology, is there a danger that it will also be an era of 
rampant meaninglessness? In this chapter, I offer counsel against any such despair. I 
argue that we should encourage the withdrawal from the world of work into a more 
personal world of games.We should do this because (a) work is structurally bad and 
getting worse as a result of technology; and (b) a more ludic, game-like life would help 
us to attain a valuable form of human flourishing. I offer three arguments in support of 
this view, and respond to critics who argue that withdrawing from the demands of work 
would result in a more selfish and impoverished form of existence.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Japanese word ‘hikkomori’ translates, roughly, as ‘to pull inwards and be confined’. 
It is a term now used to describe the living arrangements of approximately half a million 
Japanese adolescents and young adults (Jozuka, 2016; Teo, A.R. and Gaw, A. 2010; Teo 
2010). They are modern-day urban hermits. They withdraw from society and its demands. 
They live inside their digitally-saturated, climate-controlled homes, subsisting on a stream of 
entertainment and food, all made possible by the conveniences of modern technology. Some 
commentators (Teo 2010) suggest that the ‘hikkomori syndrome’ is a product of Japan’s 
demanding educational and work culture. The demands are so strenuous that some young 
people cannot cope and so withdraw into a self-created cocoon. Others argue that the 
syndrome it is not unique to the Japanese culture, with cases being reported in other countries 
as well (Ovejero et al 2014). Whatever the case, it certainly seems to be a modern-day 
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phenomenon, virtually unheard of before the 1970s, and with an ever-increasing incidence 
since then (Teo 2010).  
 
I am not a psychologist or psychiatrist. I cannot claim any expertise in diagnosing or 
understanding the phenomenon of the hikkomori. I know only what I have read. 
Nevertheless, I use them as a jumping off point for the argument in this chapter. I do so for 
two reasons. First, I think they represent one possible symptom of an underlying malaise in 
modern life, a malaise that relates specifically to our culture of work and the burdens it places 
on our psychological well-being. The burden is so great that some people are cracking under 
the pressure (Frayne 2015). What’s more, and as I have argued elsewhere (Danaher 2017 & 
2018), this burden is only set to grow as a result of increased automation. Second, and more 
controversially, I think the hikkomori represent a possible solution to this malaise. This is 
somewhat paradoxical, and I don’t wish to trivialise what many see as a serious mental health 
condition, but I do want to argue that general idea of ‘withdrawing’ from the demands of 
economic life is something that should be taken seriously as a pathway to human flourishing 
in post-work future. Indeed, I want to argue in favour of this strategy of withdrawal. 
 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on both of these ideas. In doing so, it differs 
from many of the other chapters in this book (editors please check!). Where they focus on 
how to address the income-related losses of technological unemployment, this chapter 
focuses on the meaning/purpose-related losses. For better or worse, many people derive 
meaning and self-worth from the work that they do. When work is taken away from them, or 
when it becomes increasingly precarious, this sense of meaning is threatened. It is 
theoretically easy (though perhaps practically difficult) to address the income-related losses. 
It is more conceptually challenging to address the meaning and purpose-related losses. This 
leads many people, including some of the contributors to this book, to argue in favour of 
work, particularly in its more ‘dignified’ forms. People struggle to see meaning and purpose 
beyond a work-saturated culture. Yet that is what this chapter tries to do. It does so by 
arguing (a) that our current form of work is structurally bad and its automation should be 
welcomed – hence we should welcome a genuinely post-work economy; and (b) that in 
withdrawing from the ‘real world’ we can realise a form of flourishing that satisfies our 
demands for meaning and purpose.  
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The argument develops in three parts. First, I make the case for thinking that work is 
structurally bad. Second, I make the case for thinking that the strategy of ‘withdrawal’ is 
desirable, using three arguments to bolster my case. Third, I respond to some obvious 
criticisms of my proposal. 
 
2. Work is Bad and Automation is Desirable 
My first argument is that work is bad and its automation is to be welcomed. This is an 
argument I have defended before (Danaher 2017 & 2018). What I present here is a summary 
and slight modification of these previous efforts. The argument starts with the premise that 
work is bad and that anything that hastens its demise is to be welcomed; it then notes that 
automation is something that can hasten its demise; and thus concludes that the automation of 
work is desirable. For the purposes of this chapter, I am not going to defend the claim that 
automation can hasten the demise of work. This is not an uncontroversial premise, but a full 
defence of it would require an excessive amount of time and space. It is something that has 
been defended by myself and others, at much greater length, in other work (Brynjoflsson and 
McAfee 2014; Ford 2015; Avent 2016; Frey and Osborne 2017; Danaher 2017; Danaher 
2019). For the purposes of this chapter I am asking the reader to grant, if only for the sake of 
argument, that automation can hasten the demise of work and to focus on the axiological 
premise of my argument instead. Is work really bad and should its demise be welcomed? 
 
For the purposes of my argument, ‘work’ should be defined narrowly as a type of 
economic employment, i.e. as the performance of activities and skills for the purpose of 
receiving (or in the hope of receiving) an economic reward (Danaher 2017). To claim that 
work, so defined, is a bad thing is not a new idea. There are many well-known anti-work 
theorists who have argued that work both immiserates and imprisons the ordinary worker 
(Black 1986; Gorz 1989; Frayne 2016; Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018).  
 
The problem with such arguments, as typically presented, is that they contradict the lived 
experiences of many workers. Although there are, no doubt, lots of people who feel 
immiserated and imprisoned by the work they do (Graeber 2018), there are also, no doubt, 
many who see their work as a great source of satisfaction and personal fulfillment. To insist 
that work is bad in the face of this experience stretches credulity. It usually requires an 
argument to the effect that these happy workers are victims of a kind of ‘false consciousness’. 
While they might think their work is meaningful and desirable, they are wrong to think this: 
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they have imbibed and absorbed a pro-work ideology that inures them to the true horrors of 
what they are doing. While there is something to be said for this idea, I prefer not to deny the 
actual experiences of happy workers. I prefer to make two connected points (i) that while 
certain forms of work may be quite good, and certain individual workers quite happy with 
what they do, their work takes place within an institutional structure that is bad and getting 
worse (call this the ‘structural badness thesis); and (ii) that non-work is better, i.e. that a life 
free from the demands of economic employment would allow for a greater form of personal 
fulfillment and meaning (call this the ‘opportunity cost’ thesis). Let’s briefly consider both of 
these claims.  
 
Let’s start with the claim that work is structurally bad. The basic idea here is that work in 
the modern world takes place within a set of institutional structures (markets for goods and 
services, contract and employment law norms, social welfare and entitlement law norms etc.) 
that is bad and getting worse. On a previous occasion (Danaher 2018), I suggested that the 
structural badness of work has the character of a collective action problem. While taking up 
work is often rational and beneficial from an individual’s perspective, the net result of 
everyone doing this is an equilibrium pattern of employment that is bad (and getting worse) 
for the majority of workers. The badness of this equilibrium arises from the tendency of 
modern employment to undermine individual freedom and subject workers to arbitrary 
practices of domination (Anderson 2017), from the increasingly fragmented and precarious 
nature of employment (Weil 2014; Standing 2011), from the growing levels of income 
inequality and distributive injustice in employment-related rewards (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 
2015), and from the tendency for modern work to colonise our time and our mental real estate 
(Frayne 2015). The result is that much of what we now do is geared around ensuring our 
employability and proving our productivity — so much so that we aren’t even given the 
opportunity to imagine what a world without work might be like. What’s more, all of these 
negative structural features of work are being made worse by technology: technology enables 
greater surveillance and connectivity, thereby exacerbating the tendency for work to colonise 
our minds and to undermine our freedom; the very same features also facilitate the 
fragmentation of the workplace and the precariousness of employment; and, finally, advances 
in automation often benefit the few, highly skilled workers, at the expense of the many. 
 
Let’s now consider the opportunity cost thesis. The idea here is that if we could exist in a 
world without the pressures and demands of work we might be able to flourish in a way that 
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we currently cannot. This claim is essential if you are to embrace the notion that the 
automation of work might be a good thing. If you don’t believe that non-work would be 
better, then a natural response to the structural badness thesis might be to try to slow-down 
the development of automating technologies and try to reform work from within. But if you 
believe that non-work might be better than work, you can embrace the disruptive potential of 
automating technologies. So is there any reason to believe this? Bertrand Russell (1935) 
famously argued that non-work was better than work because it would give people the 
opportunity to develop higher, intellectual virtues. Indeed, he went so far as to argue that the 
leisure classes have, historically, been responsible for all the advances of civilisation. The 
goal should be to make everyone part of the leisure class. This smacks of a certain aristocratic 
elitism, and suggests that the value of a non-working life should be measured in terms of its 
social contribution and productivity. That’s not all that different from what we currently 
have: it just replaces economic contribution and productivity with another metric of success. 
A simpler argument, and one the pushes us further away from the ‘work ethic’ paradigm, is 
that without the economic pressures and necessities of work, people will be free to do what 
they most desire to do — to pursue their own conception of the good life. Of course, this is 
only true if, having been freed from the pressures of work, they are not left starving and 
destitute. This is where proposals for the basic income, or similar schemes of welfare 
distribution, become essential to any case for a post-work future. But assuming they are not 
left starving and destitute — that they all participate fairly in the benefits of automated 
abundance — there is reason to hope that they will be free to pursue whatever meaning and 
purpose they see fit to pursue. 
 
This argument quickly runs into a problem. The hope that people who are freed from the 
yoke of work will be able to pursue whatever conception of the good life they happen to 
prefer rests on the naive assumption that the effects of automation will be limited. To be 
precise, it assumes that people will be displaced from forms of work they don’t enjoy and left 
free to pursue whatever they do enjoy. This is naive because it is unlikely that we can easily 
control the automation of different modes of work, and quite likely that advances in 
automating technologies will have far wider effects, particularly if those advances are 
sufficient to hasten the general demise of work. In a world of significant technological 
unemployment, not only will automating technologies displace humans from unpleasant 
forms of work, they will also displace humans from activities that are associated with high 
levels of meaning and satisfaction, e.g. scientific discovery, or moral/charitable work aimed 
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at alleviating the suffering of others (Danaher 2017). What’s more, even if machines don’t 
completely replace humans in the pursuit of these goods, they may assist humans in such a 
way that undermines or lessens the value of human achievements in those domains. They will 
make things too easy and sever the connection between human activity and the goods toward 
which that activity is directed. Humans will still be able to derive some meaning and purpose 
from what they do: but it will be an impoverished or lesser form. We end up with a paradox 
of sorts: the kind of automation we need to achieve a genuinely post-work world may be the 
very same kind of automation that undermines the pursuit of happiness beyond the world of 
work. What can be done about this paradox? 
 
In previous work, I argued that we could solve this paradox by pursuing an integrationist 
approach to technology (Danaher 2017). In other words, instead of racing against the 
machines we can race with them and become more machine-like ourselves. We can prioritise 
the development of technologies that enhance and augment human capacities, not 
technologies that replace or displace such capacities. This would enable us to continue to 
pursue the kinds of projects that currently bring us much meaning and happiness (e.g. 
discovery of new truths, benefitting our fellow humans and so on), without completely 
sacrificing the benefits of technology.  
 
There are, however, some significant problems with the integrationist approach. For one 
thing, it is a largely conservative strategy for dealing with the automation of work and the 
post-work world. Its appeal lies in its capacity for maintaining the current pathways to 
meaning and fulfillment. The irony then is that if the integrationist strategy were truly 
successful, it may just suck us back into the world of work — the very world that I am 
arguing we should be glad to escape. What’s more, the integrationist strategy is highly 
uncertain and unpredictable. We may not develop the requisite technologies in time to stop 
the negative effects of automation beyond the workplace, and we may not be able to develop 
them at all. To pursue the integrationist strategy is thus to make a bet that is highly uncertain 
and highly conservative. 
 
This leads one to wonder whether there might not be an alternative strategy that would 
provide a more radical break from the world we current have, while at the same time being 
more practically feasible. This is where the strategy of ‘withdrawal’ comes in. I now turn to 
the defence of that strategy. 
	7 
 
3. The Strategy of Withdrawal 
To start off, I need to clarify what I mean by the strategy of withdrawal. I understand it to 
be the practice of withdrawing from the demands of the world as it is currently constituted, 
into a world that is largely ludic or game-like in nature. This isn’t a new idea. Bob Black, a 
famous anarchist anti-work writer, long ago argued that work should be abolished in order to 
enable us to live a more play-like existence (Black 1986). And Bernard Suits, in his 
philosophical dialogue The Grasshopper, argued that a perfect technological utopia (in which 
all productive activities have been automated) would be a world in which we do nothing but 
play games. My goal is to offer a more persuasive case in favour of this approach. 
 
To do that, I have to put some shape on the idea by identifying some minimal conditions 
on what would count as a game-like existence. One minimal condition is that individuals who 
pursue a game-like existence must retreat from the world of objective, instrumental goods – 
such as economic productivity, scientific and intellectual discovery, the alleviation of 
distributive inequalities and human suffering, and so on. These things will still be important 
to human flourishing, but the assumption is they can be left, largely, to the machines to bring 
about (who will do so in a more effective, efficient and tireless manner than their human 
forebears). Individuals can then dedicate themselves to maintaining relationships with 
families and friends (always a core part of human life) and, most importantly, to game-like 
pursuits.  
 
What then is a game-like pursuit? Bernard Suits’s (2005) widely-cited definition holds 
that a game is a set of activities aimed at an arbitrarily defined end (the prelusory goal), 
where those activities are pursued in an inefficient rule-bound manner (the constitutive rules), 
and where the people playing the game willingly accept its rule-bound inefficiencies (the 
lusory attitude). Put more pithily, Suits argues that a game is any voluntary triumph over 
unnecessary obstacles. As definitions of game-like activities go, this is pretty good. But for 
present purposes, I think we need to add one more ingredient in order to properly distinguish 
game-like activities from non-game-like activities. This additional ingredient is ‘triviality’. 
That is to say, the key defining feature of a game is that it does not (and is known not to) 
serve a higher purpose or significance. Winning the game (if the game has a clear winning 
state) does not necessarily make the world a better place, improve one’s economic standing, 
or contribute to the sum total of human knowledge. Success in the game may exemplify 
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certain aesthetic virtues, it may develop individual or collective character, and it may make 
the players happy or more satisfied, but that is about it. If it does serve some additional higher 
purpose, this is entirely accidental or contingent upon its role is a certain social order. In 
short, games are things that are to be enjoyed for the performances they entail, not for the 
outcomes they realise. 
 
Insisting upon this ‘triviality’ condition helps to avoid two important errors that arise 
from thinking about games and the post-work future. First, it avoids Yuval Noah Harari’s 
mistake of presuming that everything we do is a game. Harari is interested in human 
flourishing and meaning in a post-work economy and he is dismissive of those who worry 
that in such a world we would do nothing but play sophisticated ‘virtual’ reality games of no 
ultimate significance (Harari 2017). He is dismissive because he thinks this is what we 
already do. For example, he argues that religion is a virtual reality game in which we score 
points in order to progress to the next level (heaven) and that consumerism is a virtual reality 
game in which we score points in order to gain social status. While this reframing of current 
social practices as games has a delightful insouciance to it — and may appeal to someone 
like me who is deeply sceptical of religion and modern capitalism — it clearly does violence 
to those who actually live those belief systems. They don’t think that what they are doing is 
trivial or virtual or game-like. They think it is very real and very important. Insisting on the 
triviality condition avoids conflating or stretching the concept of the game so far as to include 
these serious pursuits.  
 
Similarly, it avoids the error of assuming that much of what the work we currently do is 
an elaborate (if occasionally torturous) game. Someone who has read David Graeber’s 
critique of modern employment may be inclined to make this error (Graeber 2018).1 Graeber 
argues that many of the jobs in modern service and knowledge economies are, as he bluntly 
puts it, ‘bullshit’: they serve no higher purpose or need, and the people working in them are 
aware of this but try to ignore it or justify it. I don’t deny Graeber’s claims about the 
pointlessness of much work. I would just argue that it is a mistake to infer from this that work 
as currently constituted is an elaborate game. It is not. While the tasks that make up any 
particular job might be trivial and pointless, having a job is not. It is economically and 
socially necessary. Without a job you will more than likely be left destitute and unable to 
																																																												
1 I don’t suggest here that Graeber himself makes this mistake. 
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thrive, and viewed as a social pariah. This makes work something that is far from a game. 
You would have to sever the connection between bullshit work and instrumental economic 
gain to make it a game. Insisting on the triviality condition avoids trivialising current forms 
of work. 
 
The importance of the triviality condition should not, however, be misunderstood. To say 
that games and game-like activities are trivial does not mean they are ‘unreal’ or 
‘unimportant’. The things that happen within the games might be very real indeed. You can 
develop real skills and capacities within a game. You can forge real friendships and alliances. 
You can experience real pain, joy, frustration and satisfaction. None of this need be trivial. 
It’s just that the game itself that serves no larger purpose.  
 
So, to clarify, in arguing for the strategy of withdrawal I am arguing that we should 
retreat from the demands of the world as currently constituted, with its focus on instrumental 
activities and economic gains, to a world of largely game-like activities (with plenty of time 
for sociability, family and friendship). I make no prescriptions about the kinds of game-like 
activities people will or should pursue in this post-work future. To make such prescriptions 
would undermine one of the benefits of escaping the world of work: the freedom to pursue 
that which you desire to pursue. I only make prescriptions about the abstract properties of 
game-like activities, properly construed.  
 
But even if you focus on those abstract properties, I suspect you will have some 
questions. Why on earth would a game-like world be desirable? How could humans flourish 
if they knew that what they were doing was ultimately trivial? I have three arguments to 
offer. 
 
(i) The Argument from Internal Goods and the Value of Craft 
The first argument is that a life of game-like activities provides a forum in which people 
can foster the mindset of the ‘craftsperson’2 and so realise the internal goods associated with 
a wide variety of activities. The argument consists of four premises and a conclusion (note: 
this is not intended to be a formally valid statement of the argument): 
 
																																																												
2 I say ‘person’ to be gender neutral. The more common term in the literature is ‘craftsman’. This is the title of 
Sennett’s book on the topic. 
	10 
(1) The life of the craftsperson is one that sustains human flourishing. 
 
(2) The life of the craftsperson is distorted by economic and instrumental pressures; 
i.e. the life of the craftsperson can be best sustained in a world without those 
pressures. 
 
(3) The game-like world is a world without these distorting pressures; and is one that 
can sustain the life of the craftsperson. 
 
(4) Therefore, the life of the craftsperson is best sustained in the game-like world. 
 
Let’s go through each premise of this argument in more detail. The first premise is crucial 
because it establishes that the life of craft is one that can sustain human flourishing. This is 
not some novel or odd ideal. It is one with very deep roots in human society and thought 
(Sennett 2008). The life of the craftsperson is one that is dedicated to the skilful mastery of 
certain patterns of action. Think about the master chess-player, who can strategically plan and 
execute moves in anticipation of what her opponent might do, and who has spent years 
learning sequences of openings and endings and the consequences they entail. Or think about 
the master furniture-maker or blacksmith, who has dedicated their lives to the skilful and 
artistic manipulation of wood and metal to their own ends. These ‘masters’ are often taken to 
represent the pinnacle of human performance and expression. They are absorbed and 
dedicated to what they do. They derive tremendous satisfaction and self-worth from it. 
Sometimes crafts are largely physical, and dedicated to producing outputs (e.g. an item of 
furniture or a sword); sometimes they are more intellectual and based on skilful performances 
(e.g. the winning moves of the master chess player). But even when they are output-oriented, 
they are never really about the instrumental gains associated with those outputs. As Richard 
Sennett puts it in his book about the value of craft, the crasftperson’s labour is purely self-
contained: they do what they do for the love of it, not because it will bring them greater 
success or more money (Sennett 2008, 20). This dedicated performance is an important kind 
of human flourishing. Indeed, some authors go so far as to argue that it provides us with a 
secular equivalent of the sacred (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, 197). 
 
In addition to its intuitive and historical appeal, the notion that the life of the craftsperson 
can sustain human flourishing does has some additional philosophical support. Alisdair 
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MacIntyre’s famous account of the good life makes the point that the good life is not 
something that can be defined or determined in the abstract (MacIntyre 1981): to be honest or 
courageous or virtuous only something that be understood or make sense relative to some 
activity. In other words, the ‘thick’ sense of the good can only be realised within specific 
domains of activity. You can be a courageous warrior or a courageous football player; you 
cannot be courageous simpliciter. This makes intuitive sense. The radical aspect of 
MacIntyre’s view is that any activity can take on this role of providing a forum for the 
realisation of some virtues and goods, as long as it is pursued in a serious and dedicated 
fashion. There are some exceptions, of course. A completely immoral activity couldn’t do the 
trick, since its broader consequences would corrupt any of its internal goods. For example, an 
honest torturer is not living the good life. Furthermore, to really count as part of the good life 
the particular domain of activity would also have to have some resonance within a broader 
cultural tradition, otherwise the individual might question its role in their life. But neither of 
these constraints should concern us here. The life of the craftsperson within a world of game-
like activities easily satisfies both of these demands. The triviality of game-like activities 
ensures that they serve no wicked or evil purpose; they are morally neutral with respect to 
their broader consequences. And, as noted already, the ideal of the craftsperson is something 
with deep cultural and historical relevance. 
 
Moving on then to second premise, why think that the life of the craftsperson is distorted 
by economic and instrumental pressures? The reasoning is straightforward. The good of craft 
lies in the skilful dedication to performance. If the performance must also serve some 
instrumental end, there is a danger that this end will distract or undermine the skilful 
performance. Sennett (2008, 28ff)  argues that the capitalistic profit motive often forces 
craftspeople to sacrifice art and skill for the mediocrity of mass production; and that 
communistic central planning often replaces skill with incompetence. Whatever the nature of 
the instrumental pressure, if a craftsperson is beholden to it there is always a risk that they 
will have to compromise on the craft itself. They may have to compete with others for the 
relevant instrumental ends and become absorbed by that competition (and its economic or 
personal necessity) instead of the craft.  
 
This brings us to the third premise. The argument in favour of this premise should be 
relatively clear from the foregoing. Games themselves provide a forum for skilful 
performance and, as defined and characterised, the game-like world is one in which the 
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instrumental pressures of work have been removed. They no longer serve to distort the 
pursuit of the craft within the confines of the game. It is true that there could be other 
distorting instrumental pressures, such as a pressure to achieve social status or recognition. 
But these pressures are present anyway and it is probably impossible to completely eliminate 
them. Eliminating the major economic instrumental pressures is still valuable and still makes 
it more possible to realise the value craft. It would be a better mode of existence even if it is 
not a perfect one.  
 
More important is whether games can in fact allow for the life of the craftsperson to 
develop. There are two reasons for thinking that they can. First, many of the activities we 
currently perceive as crafts, and as activities that can sustain the value of crafting, would 
continue to do so in the post-work world. Following Suits’s definition of a game as the 
voluntary triumph over unnecessary obstacles, we see that many of the traditional crafts are 
nowadays games. Nobody needs a blacksmith to handcraft a sword, or a carpenter to 
handcraft a table. These things can all be done more efficiently and effectively by machines. 
They are quasi-game-like in the modern world; the only thing that prevents them from being 
games that is that many people still pursue them for economic reward. I’m just imagining a 
world in which these economic rewards are no longer part of the picture. In addition to this, it 
should be clear that games of all kinds are themselves are forums in which the skilful mastery 
of performances are both encouraged and rewarded.  
 
In conclusion then, the life of the craftsperson is something that can sustain human 
flourishing and is something that can be realised, to a heightened degree, in the post-work, 
game-like world. 
 
(ii) The Argument from Arendt 
The second argument riffs off some ideas from Hannah Arendt’s book The Human 
Condition (1958/98). In that book, Arendt develops a conceptually complex account of 
human activity. She argues that there are three basic forms of human activity: labour, work 
and action. Each of these forms of activity responds to (or is contingent upon) one or more of 
the basic conditions of human existence. Labour is dedicated to the urgent and repetitive 
maintenance of the biological systems of life: we labour to eat, stave off threats to survival, 
and to reproduce. Work is dedicated to developing a constructed human environment: to 
building a world of artefacts and symbols that is stable, durable and distinct from the natural 
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world. Action is dedicated to sociability and spontaneity, i.e. to doing new and creative things 
in an environment with other human beings serving as either audience or collaborators. 
 
Arendt orders these three modes of activity into a hierarchy of value. She thinks that 
labour is the most base and inferior mode of activity. It is the least distinctively human as it is 
so tied to the biological realities of existence. Action is the most human and therefore the 
most advanced form of activity. It allows for genuine creativity and novelty (what Arendt 
calls ‘natality’). Work lies somewhere in between. A natural consequence of this hierarchy is 
that, for Arendt, a world in which action (and to some extent work) is prioritised and allowed 
to flourish is better than a world in which labour dominates. One of her central claims is that 
technological modernity has a negative impact on human flourishing by reducing all human 
activity to labouring. She criticises automating technologies in particular. So-called ‘labour 
saving’ devices have, she argues, increased the prominence of labour in human life. We work 
to produce machines that are themselves dedicated to maintaining our biological systems of 
life. In other words, our work now serves labour. As a result, labour has become the 
preeminent and most valorised mode of human activity. Action has been all but forgotten and 
work has been degraded to the handmaiden of labour. As Arendt puts it, there is now a 
relentless ’instrumentalization of the world and of the earth, this limitless devaluation of 
everything given, this process of growing meaninglessness where every end is transformed 
into a means’ (Arendt 1958/98, 121). 
 
The argument I make here is that by embracing the disruptive potential of automation, 
and withdrawing into the game-like world, we can recapture the higher forms of activity (the 
purer form of work and the spontaneity of action) and save them from the relentless 
instrumentalisation that Arendt abhors. Again, the reason for this is partly built into the 
characterisation of the game-like world. It is a world that is free from the instrumental 
pressures of work as currently constituted. It is a world in which performances are all that 
matter. This world can allow for spontaneity — in both the discovery of new ‘moves’ within 
an existing game and in the creation of new games; and it can allow for the right kind of 
sociability and political engagement — in the way in which the games allow for actions to 
take place before an audience of peers and within a collaborative space, and in the way in 
which freeing us from the yoke of work will allow us to dedicate more time to the political 
sphere of action (somewhat akin to the ancient leisured classes of Greece and Rome).   
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Of course, the appeal of this argument lies largely in the appeal of Arendt’s conceptual 
framework. If you reject that framework, and the hierarchy it establishes, you may be less 
swayed. That’s why I don’t rest too much weight on it here. It is just one argument among 
three. Nevertheless, I think Arendt’s concerns about relentless instrumentalisation, and the 
need to develop a form of existence that frees us from this instrumentalisation, are valid and 
provide a good reason to embrace the strategy of withdrawal. If everything we do must serve 
some ephemeral and seemingly urgent need, we can never truly feel satisfied with our lives. 
Our current world is one that fixates on ephemeral and urgent needs: the next paycheck, the 
promotion, the degree or qualification. Everything is pursued, achieved and quickly forgotten 
(Landau 2018, ch 11). A more ludic life would allow us to wallow in the pleasures of the 
moment, and the virtues of our actions in and of themselves. This is a legitimate and 
desirable form of flourishing. 
 
(iii) The Argument from Idleness 
The third argument makes a virtue out of a perceived vice. One thing that people often 
worry about in a post-work world, particularly one in which ‘withdrawal’ from the 
instrumental demands of the world is celebrated, is that people will do nothing with their new 
found freedom. They will become idle, slothful and selfish. They will have no care for the 
morrow; they will become absorbed in moment-to-moment pleasures. They will have no 
direction or purpose or meaning. As Voltaire famously put it in Candide, ‘work saves a man 
from three great evils: boredom, vice and need’. If you don’t have to work for a living, you 
won’t have the discipline or focus you need to truly flourish. 
 
This fear of idleness has been with us for a long time. As Brian O’Connor (2018) notes in 
his extended philosophical essay on the topic, many famous Enlightenment thinkers, 
including most notably Immanuel Kant, railed against the idea of idleness. Kant went so far 
as argue that we have a duty not to waste our talents, and that to be a truly autonomous, well-
rounded individual, you have to work hard, make the most of yourself, and triumph over any 
tendency toward apathy (O’Connor 2018, 37ff). This is a theme taken up by several more 
contemporary theorists of autonomy, including Richard Arneson and Christine Korsgaard 
(O’Connor 2018, 177). They all advocate what O’Connor calls a ‘muscular autonomy’ which 
insists on the presence of goals, targets and other instrumental pressures to lift us out of a 
primitive, pre-rational, purely instinctual mode of existence. They don’t want us to slip back 
into this pre-rational mode of life. It looks like there is a risk that we will do exactly that if we 
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embrace the strategy of withdrawal. Indeed, I suspect this is what people worry about most 
when they look at the hikkomori. They see people who are not applying themselves, whose 
ambitions are paltry, and who can get what they want too easily and too conveniently. They 
are quick to pathologise this form of life, not to celebrate it. 
 
The standard response to this fear of idleness among post-work thinkers is to argue that it 
is mistaken. When freed from the yoke of work, people don’t succumb to the temptations of 
idleness. On the contrary, they often apply themselves with great industry to the pursuits they 
truly enjoy. This, once again, is Bertrand Russell’s famous defence of idleness: that it will 
enable people to invest in building the great artefacts of civilisation, as the leisure classes of 
old have always done. Whether Russell’s argument would continue to hold true in world of 
rampant automation is, for the time being, anyone’s guess (we cannot run the exact 
experiment just yet), but all the experiments on basic income schemes around the world to 
date suggest that people who receive a non-contingent income do not succumb to idleness 
(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017 138-144; Widerquist 2005). They invest in improving 
themselves and their families. The assumption and hope is that they will continue to do this in 
a post-work future. 
 
But there is another way of looking at it. As O’Connor argues in his essay, idleness is not 
necessarily a vice. On the contrary, looked at in the right way, idleness may be exactly what 
we need in order to live truly free and autonomous lives (O’Connor 2018, 179-186). 
O’Connor develops this argument in three ways, each of which applies quite well to the post-
work world. First, he argues that most accounts of what it means to be a free and autonomous 
individual insist on authenticity, i.e. that the person lives a life of their own choosing, not one 
that conforms to the expectations and demands of others. A world of idle withdrawal is more 
conducive to this than the world in which we currently live. In a world in which we must 
work out of economic necessity, we cannot be fully authentic (or if we can be it is largely a 
matter of luck): we must conform to the demands of the market, our clients, our employers 
and our economic dependents. If we remove the economic necessity of work, we can be more 
authentic. Second, he argues that most accounts of autonomy insist on an independence 
condition, i.e. that an individual is not subject to manipulation, coercion or indoctrination by 
others. Again, a world of idle withdrawal and game-like activities is more conducive to this 
than the world in which we currently live. The demands of the market economy and its 
associated work ethic mean that we are easily manipulated into doing things out of some 
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genuine or perceived need for money, status or employment. These manipulating forces 
dissipate in idleness. We are free to adopt reasons for action that are desired in and of 
themselves; not ones that are forced upon us by others. Third, and finally, although some 
people worry that idleness is without its own ethic (its own sense of the good life), this is not 
the case. To live an idle life is to embrace a clear conception of the good life, one that 
prioritises freedom from external demands, and non-instrumentalism in activity. Again, these 
are goods that can flourish in the post-work world, particularly in the world of games with its 
focus on performance over outcome. 
 
In sum, to the extent that we value freedom and autonomy, we should try to create a mode 
of existence that celebrates idleness over industriousness. The strategy of withdrawal into 
game-like activities does exactly that. 
 
4. Final Criticisms and Concerns 
I will conclude by considering some general criticisms and concerns about the argument 
developed over the preceding sections. To briefly recap, that argument has come in two parts. 
First, I argued that work is structurally bad and that its automation is something to be desired. 
I then noted that this argument runs into the paradox of desirable automation: the kinds of 
automation we need to hasten the demise of work are likely to impact on human flourishing 
in other ways. This led us to the second part of the argument: the strategy of withdrawal. I 
argued that by withdrawing from the world as currently constituted we can resolve the 
paradox of automation and realise a genuine and desirable form of human flourishing. Far 
from this being something to fear and lament, it is something to desire and hasten. 
 
I appreciate that this argument may be tough to swallow. The most obvious criticism is 
that the vision of the good life being imagined here is somewhat impoverished. Even if it is 
true that withdrawal satisfies some of our demands for meaning and purpose, it does not 
satisfy them all. Ceding the pursuit of the classic objective goods (like the pursuit of 
knowledge and the alleviation of suffering) to machines must surely result in a ‘lesser’ 
existence for us humans? We would much rather participate in the pursuit of those goods.  
 
There are three responses to this criticism. First, it’s not clear that this is an impoverished 
form of flourishing. The human good is pluralistic and multi-faceted: different modes of 
existence help us to realise different mixtures of goods. It’s hard to say that these modes of 
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existence can be ordered into a clear hierarchy of ‘betterness’ or ‘worseness’: pursuing one 
objective good often comes at a cost to other goods (e.g. friends and family). What’s more, 
on some plausible theories, a mode of existence in which we do nothing but play games and 
pursue trivialities really does represent the best hope for humankind. This is Suits’s famous 
argument for the ‘utopia of games’ (Suits 2005). He suggests that if we live in a world in 
which do nothing but play games all the time, it must be because we have achieved a level of 
technical mastery over the world that eliminates the basic forms of human suffering and want 
from life. Surely that is as close to the best of all possible worlds as we can hope to get? 
Second, even if there is something less desirable about a world in which humans pursue 
trivialities and machines pursue objective goods, we may, ironically, have a moral obligation 
to prefer that world over the alternative.This would be the case if the machines are able to 
realise those goods in a more efficient and effective way, and if humans actually impede or 
hinder the pursuit of those goods. We already see some reason to suspect that we face this 
choice. Consider the debate around the merits of self-driving cars. These merits are often 
expressed in terms of the safety benefits for humans. Suppose these benefits are real. Would 
it be right for a human to insist upon driving when they know that this poses a greater risk to 
their fellow humans? Clearly not. The same logic could take hold in many other domains of 
activity, thus ethically requiring us to prefer withdrawal over continued engagement. Third, I 
suspect that any lingering insistence on the ‘lesser’ virtues of withdrawal stem from the 
suspicion that the benefits of this mode existence are somehow surreal or unreal. For 
example, someone might argue that success in a game is not ‘real’ success because it lacks 
real stakes. I hope it is clear from what was said earlier that this is a misconception about 
what life in a game-like world would be like. There is nothing surreal or unreal about what 
happens in such a world. The skills and virtues we develop are real: they just happen to be 
tied to a particular set of performances that are ultimately trivial. If we follow MacIntyre this 
is all we can ever hope for when it comes to skills and virtues: they only ever make sense 
relative to some defined domain of activity. It is only when they are embedded in such a 
domain that they become ‘real’. 
 
Another criticism people are likely to have is that the world being imagined is one that 
lends itself to isolation, selfishness and narcissistic pleasure-seeking. If we don’t have to 
work for a living, and if we don’t have to strive to produce objective goods for the rest of 
humanity, then we lose the outward, other-facing domain of life. We will become inward-
looking and self-
	18 
are seen as a group of people that have turned inward and lost the will to communicate, 
engage and be held accountable to others. 
 
There are two responses to this criticism. First, although I did use them as a jumping off 
point for the argument in this chapter, the argument I have developed should not be mistaken 
for endorsing the hikkomori way of life. My understanding of what it means to withdraw 
from the pressures of life is slightly different from theirs and is wholly consistent with a 
flourishing social and family life. In fact, I would argue that it is work and its insatiable 
demands that takes us away from these outward looking and other facing activities. 
Withdrawing from the world of work makes it possible to engage with them with greater 
vigour. Second, even though I make this distinction, I suspect some of the concern and 
indignation around isolation and selfishness only makes sense in a world of instrumental 
pressures. If you have to work to survive and thrive, and to ensure that others survive and 
thrive, any desire to withdraw from work will seem overly selfish and narcissistic. You will 
not be making your contribution to collective economic well-being; you will be living off the 
backs of others. In a world without those instrumental pressures, the withdrawal from work 
will seem a lot less selfish and narcissistic. It will seem like a reasonable choice. 
 
This brings us to another potential criticism: that I am overselling the difference between 
what would happen in the game-like world and what happens in our world now. The claim 
I’m advancing is that in the game-like world the distorting effects of instrumental pressures 
would be removed from human activity. But surely this is naive? Even if we succeed in 
removing economic pressures, or the pressure to do some objective good, it is likely that 
other instrumental pressures will step in to take their place. For example, people will want 
fame and social status, and they may use games as a stepping stone to such ends. These new 
instrumental ends are just as likely to corrupt or undermine the value of withdrawal. 
 
There are two responses to this criticism. First, as hinted at previously, we shouldn’t 
make the perfect an enemy of the better when it comes to the elimination of instrumental 
pressures. Our current world is one in which our activities are distorted by a wide range of 
instrumental pressures, including the need for money and the desire for fame and social 
status. Eliminating some of the major instrumental pressures from the mix will make for a 
better, and less distorted, mode of existence, one in which the virtues of craft, action and 
idleness have more space to breathe. In this regard, I think it is especially important not to 
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understate the negative impact that the pressures of work have on life as currently lived. 
Eliminating its instrumental pressures would be a major improvement. Second, 
notwithstanding this point, there is reason to hope that instrumental pressures such as the 
desire for fame or social status will hold less sway in a post-work world. For one thing, the 
desire for fame and social status is currently catalysed by the desire for economic security 
and success: the latter strengthens the former. In a world of automated abundance, this 
strengthening effect will be lessened. Furthermore, we already have ample evidence to 
suggest that the possibility of fame and status does not distort or undermine the conviction 
with which people play games. The leagues of amateur sportspeople, hobbyists and gamers, 
who show up week-in-week-out for the love of what they do, and not for fame or glory, is 
testament to this. It suggests, at the very least, that a large majority of people can flourish in 
playing games without worrying about other instrumental ends those games may serve. 
 
Finally, there is the criticism that the strategy of withdrawal is impractical. Remember, I 
originally sold the idea of withdrawal on the grounds that it was more practical (and more 
radical) than the integrationist strategy that I favoured in earlier work. The integrationist 
strategy may help to conserve much of what we currently value, but it is technically uncertain 
and potentially impossible. The strategy of withdrawal is, on the face of it, much more 
tractable. But maybe this is not quite right? Maybe to truly embrace the ludic life, we would 
have undergo a major cultural revolution3 that would be just as impractical and uncertain as 
the technical obstacles facing the integrationist strategy. 
 
I think this criticism is a bit of a stretch, but, nevertheless, there are two responses to it. 
First, if it does require a major cultural revolution, this is a revolution that may be forced 
upon us anyway as a result of technological change and the effects it has on the mechanics of 
capitalism. If advances in automation result in significant increases in the ‘surplus 
population’ (i.e. the people who are not needed for the productive work of capitalism), then 
we will have to come up with some conception of the good life that is attainable and 
meaningful to them (and, to be clear, this is not an ‘us vs them’ issue — I include myself 
within their potential ranks). Second, I think what I have said in the preceding sections should 
make it clear that this strategy of withdrawal and the pursuit of ludic pleasures, is not 
completely alien to human society. It has a long cultural and philosophical pedigree. It is just 
																																																												
3 I appreciate the historical resonances of this term and call upon them deliberately in order to make a strong 
case for the prosecution. 
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that the institutional structure of modern capitalism has blocked us from fully realising it. As 
those institutional structures start to fray, it becomes both tangible and realisable. It wouldn’t 
require a major cultural revolution; just a cultural reprioritisation. 
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